With an upset that jarring, I’m a lot more concerned with the why and how it happened. Most of us are asking a version of the same question: was this a one-off bad day, or is this thing close to going off the rails?

A shocking loss can lead to some emotional reactions, and I’m glad that fans handled this loss to South Carolina a little better than they did the 2012 loss. This time most of the ire seems to be focused on the coaches, and especially the offensive coordinator. Georgia has a collection of five-star skill players, the self-proclaimed “best offensive line in the nation”, and a veteran “coach on the field” quarterback. The perception after the game is that Georgia has a garage full of sports cars that are only driven in first gear.

There’s a few of those reactions I’m not sold on – not because they’re wrong but because they might lead us in the wrong direction.

For example, the turnovers hurt, and one in particular set the tone for the entire second half. But three of them occurred after the start of the fourth quarter. Kirby Smart was correct that it’s tough to win with a -4 turnover margin. It’s true that Georgia likely gets points from one or two of those possessions and wins this particular game. At the same time Georgia played three quarters with one turnover and still only managed ten points. The turnovers were not holding back Georgia’s offense.

Still another narrative was Georgia’s slow start. Georgia got points on two of their first three drives. The next drive lasted ten plays before a fourth down stop on South Carolina’s side of the field. If you want to define a slow start as not putting up 35 points in the first half, fine, it was a slow start. Georgia’s offense was at its most productive, such as it was, earlier in the game. It could not adjust after South Carolina took away the sideline passes and began to choke off the run.

I don’t bring up those narratives to dismiss them – Georgia did seem as if it was banging its head against a wall on offense. The turnovers were costly, particularly with three in South Carolina territory. Ten points in the first half isn’t a blistering start. I just think there’s a bigger issue that helps to explain what we saw. Bill Connelly was kind (or morbidly curious) enough on Sunday afternoon to post the advanced stats box score of the game, and there was one line that jumps out.

A key element of Georgia’s identity on offense over the past three seasons has been explosiveness. The Dawgs have been successful generating big plays, especially from the running game. It’s not just the highlight runs by Swift to end last season’s Kentucky and Auburn games – it’s been a steady ability to turn moderate gains into chunk plays. What happens when that explosiveness is taken away? Georgia’s longest run against Notre Dame was a 16-yard carry. Georgia, without turning the ball over, managed 23 points. Against South Carolina Georgia’s longest run was 14 yards. Zamir White had one for 12 yards, but not many others came close to double-digit yardage.

To paraphrase Connelly’s summary of the game, South Carolina more or less hit only one big play in the game – their lone offensive touchdown – and that was enough to finish with a better explosiveness metric (IsoPPP) than Georgia. Both teams were well below average in generating big plays in this game (you don’t need advanced stats to tell you that), but Georgia was even more below average. Worse, Georgia’s bread-and-butter running game was the least explosive element of its offense.

That doesn’t mean that Georgia’s running game was shut down. Georgia’s rushing success rate on running plays was 53% – well above the national average. Without the threat of a big play though, it meant that Georgia had to be successful on more plays to sustain and finish drives. That was the tough part. When you’re moving 5-6 yards at a time instead of getting more explosive 20-yard gains, it takes just a single penalty, incompletion, or stuffed run to throw things off. Sure enough, Georgia’s success rate on passing downs was a so-so 31%.

Not all successful plays are equal. A 25-yard carry is definitely successful, but so is a 5-yard carry on first down. A problem is that Georgia’s successful plays are becoming less successful. Georgia is averaging 7 yards per play (YPP) this year – good for 7th in the nation. Over the past three games against a trio of P5 opponents, it’s a lower 5.9 YPP and much closer to the national average of 5.71 YPP. Against South Carolina it was just 4.93 YPP – a good two yards off Georgia’s typical performance and almost a full yard off the national average. The Dawgs had a respectable 53% success rate on standard downs. Second down though was where it fell apart. The Dawgs have been one of the best teams in the nation on second down in recent years, but they were adrift in this game. Georgia often found themselves with a reasonable second down situation that turned into 18 third down plays, many of them medium-to-long.

Georgia’s struggle to break off long runs might have mattered less had the passing game been able to create its own big plays, but that wasn’t happening either. South Carolina manned up against Georgia on the outside and contested most every deep shot. Fromm’s 5.26 yards per attempt was well below his usual, and it was even lower on passing downs when he completed just 10-of-20 for 108 yards. As Georgia failed to show much of a downfield threat, South Carolina’s defense became more effective around the line of scrimmage. Interior runs were less productive, short routes were covered, and Fromm felt more pressure.

The South Carolina defense put Georgia in a position of having to string together modest gains to move the ball. Georgia’s defense did the same thing – and they were pretty effective at it. South Carolina’s success rate for the game was only 34%, and it wasn’t much better when Hilinski was in the game. When that’s the case, things like field position begin to matter more. The Bulldog defense forced stops time after time in the second half, but the offense was unable to do much when it got the ball back. Georgia’s average starting field position for the game was its own 27.8 yard line. Not horrible, but rarely was it better than that. The defense didn’t lose the game, but they also didn’t flip the field with turnovers of their own or even pin South Carolina deep on the few opportunities it had to do so.

Another way to flip the field is with special teams. Camarda had his best game of the season and did his part. (Just another quirk of this game that both teams scored touchdowns after their worst starting field position.) Georgia forced seven South Carolina punts and got zero return yards. Blaylock handled the returner role well and cleanly fielded several punts while allowing others to safely roll into the endzone. Georgia though did little to help its offense improve its starting field position. I get it – several of South Carolina’s punts came from around midfield or in short-yardage situations. “Punt safe” is the right call there, and there won’t be a return. That wasn’t the case with other punts. Blaylock had a good ten yard cushion on the first punt but called for the fair catch. On others, Georgia didn’t do much to disrupt South Carolina’s gunners, and Blaylock had no choice but to fair catch.

The central question moving forward is whether Georgia can be an explosive offense against better defenses. (South Carolina might not be a great team, but its defense is still top 20 in SP+.) Georgia’s explosiveness metric was below average against Notre Dame. It was worse than that on Saturday. Several more defenses are on the schedule with talent as good as or better than Georgia has faced. Whether it has to do with the coordinator change and playcalling/scheme, inexperience at receiver, or execution, an important advantage that propelled the Georgia offense over the past couple of seasons is vanishing. Getting that edge back is job #1 heading into the defining stretch of the season.